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LOOK TO WINDWARD: THE MICHIGAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT AND 
THE CASE FOR ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 
LITIGATION IN THE MITTEN STATE 
 
Jonathan M. Coumes* 
 
Failure to address climate change or even slow the growth of carbon emissions has 
led to innovation in the methods activists are using to push decisionmakers away from disaster. 
In the United States, climate activists frustrated by decades of legislative and executive 
inaction have turned to the courts to force the hand of the state. In their most recent iteration, 
climate cases have focused on the public trust doctrine, the notion that governments hold their 
jurisdictions’ natural resources in trust for the public. Plaintiffs have argued that the 
atmosphere is part of the public trust and that governments have a duty to protect it. 
These types of lawsuits, known as Atmospheric Trust Litigation, have foundered 
on the shoals of courts wary of exceeding their powers, whether granted by Article III or state 
constitutions. The trouble in many cases, including Juliana v. United States, has been 
standing. Courts balk at declaring that any one actor has the power to affect climate change. 
Since they usually think one actor can’t fix the climate, redressability is out the window. Even 
if courts get past redressability, they believe the scale of any potential relief is just beyond the 
ability of a court to order. The number of lawsuits that have been filed suggests that that 
reasonable minds can differ, but most judges have found plaintiffs do not have standing before 
clearing the cases off their dockets. 
This Note contends that at least one state remains fertile ground for an atmospheric 
trust lawsuit. Michigan’s 1963 Constitution implies that the atmosphere is within the public 
trust, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, passed to carry out the state’s 
constitutional duties towards the natural world, does away with most, if not all, of the 
standing issues that have stymied climate cases across the nation. Motions, briefs, and 
equitable relief are not the only way to avoid the onset of what could be the greatest calamity 
in the history of humanity, but in Michigan, at least, Atmospheric Trust Litigation may well 




* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Candidate, 2021. I am grateful to Marielle Coutrix, Jared 
Looper, Evan Neustater, Amita Maram, and Jeff Haynes for their commentary and incisive critiques of 
this Note, and especially to the entire MJEAL staff for their tireless efforts in editing and cite-checking—
in the law journal business, we all know who the real heroes are. 
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Every year, the climate prognosis worsens. Every year, there’s less ice at 
the poles, more wildfires, more storms and hurricanes. Every year, more shock at 
how far the changing atmosphere has overshot our estimates of carbon gained, 
degrees raised, and ice lost.1 And as the years tick by, it becomes ever clearer that our 
politics has no grasp on the problem.2 The Paris Agreement, the world’s foremost 
collective compact on climate, sets emissions targets far too lax to keep global 
warming under two degrees Celsius.3  Four years out and states are already missing 
the Paris targets widely.4 Not only has the world’s largest economy left the 
agreement, but its leader seems determined to accelerate carbon emissions.5 Between 
 
1. See David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, N.Y. MAG. (July 10, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-too-hot-for-humans.html.  
2. Id. 
3. David Roberts, No Country on Earth Is Taking the 2 Degree Climate Target Seriously, VOX (Apr. 
29, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/10/4/13118594/2-degrees-no-more-fossil-fuels.  
4. Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, The World Still Isn’t Meeting Its Climate Goals, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/07/climate/world-emissions-paris-goals-
not-on-track.html.  
5. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreement-climate.html; see also 




American intransigence and the weakness of the Paris Agreement, worldwide effort 
has not been moving in a positive direction.6 
As international institutions fail to address climate change, it’s no wonder 
that every year, more people from more disciplines are looking for ways to bring their 
expertise to bear on the crisis.7 Given the current American administration’s 
obduracy on climate,8 it’s unsurprising that activists in the United States are on the 
hunt for new ways to put legal force behind their arguments. One of the most exciting 
avenues being pursued is the public trust suit.  
The flagship public trust climate case is Juliana v. United States, in which a 
group of young people have sought to force the federal government to curtail the 
fossil fuel industry’s ability to emit greenhouse gases (“GHGs”).9 While the Ninth 
Circuit has dismissed the case on standing grounds, other plaintiffs have made similar 
arguments using state public trust doctrines.10 The possibility of a state-by-state 
approach comes with several advantages.11 State public trust doctrine is often 
stronger than the federal version (if one even exists), and  plaintiffs are not tasked 
with devising a national climate regime in their prayers for relief.12 The first waves 
 
Maya Kosoff, Trump’s Ignorance Is Exacerbating an Ecological Apocalypse, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/11/trumps-ignorance-is-exacerbating-an-ecological-apocalypse.  
6. See, e.g., Graham Readfearn, Australia’s Climate Response Among the Worst in the G20, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2019, 12:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/11/australi
a-climate-response-among-worst-g20; Gary Fuller, Pollutionwatch: Africa Increases its Reliance on Fossil 
Fuels, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7 2019, 04:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/nov/07/po
llutionwatch-africa-increases-reliance-fossil-fuels; Andrew Freedman, Amazon Fires Could Accelerate Global 
Warming and Cause Lasting Harm to a Cradle of Biodiversity, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/08/21/amazonian-rainforest-is-ablaze-turning-day-into-
night-brazils-capital-city/.  
7. See, e.g., Top 50 Non-Profit Organizations Working to Stop Climate Change, CLIMATESTORE 
(Mar. 18, 2020, 4:49 PM), https://climatestore.com/take-action/get-involved/non-profit-organizations-
working-on-climate-change (listing, inter alia, Mothers Out Front and the Catholic Climate Covenant).  
8. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Watchdog, Citing ‘Open Defiance’ of Inquiries, Rebukes Top 
Agency Aide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/06/climate/epa-watchdog-
chief-of-staff.html.  
9. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 (D. Or. 2016). 
10. See infra Section II.A. 
11. See generally Matthew Schneider, Where Juliana Went Wrong: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine 
to Climate Change Adaptation at the State Level, 41 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 59 (2017). 
12. See id. at 59-60. 




of state-level cases have encountered resistance,13 but atmospheric public trust 
advocates fight on.14 
This Note will lay out the historical foundations of the public trust doctrine 
in Part I, explore past and ongoing state-level efforts to expand the public trust 
doctrine to include the atmosphere in Part II, survey Michigan’s public trust doctrine 
in Part III, and then evaluate the chances that a public trust lawsuit would have in 
Michigan in Part IV. Finally, this Note will conclude that Michigan’s peculiar 
standing law and its Environmental Protection Act show the state is fertile ground 
for an atmospheric trust lawsuit. 
I. THE ROOTS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
Public trust is one of the more ancient doctrines alive in American law. 
Scholars and practitioners alike trace its origins to the Institutes of Justinian,15 which 
provide that “the following things are by natural law common to all—the air, running 
water, the sea, and consequently the seashore.”16 That is, there are certain things 
which no one owns because they cannot rightly be owned, “for [they] are not, like the 
sea itself, subject to the law of nations,” and are instead reserved by the sovereign for 
the use of all.17 The ‘public trust doctrine’ posits that certain natural resources—
including the air, the navigable waters, and the shore—are held in trust for the people 
and managed by the government.18 The trust doctrine operates the same way today 
that it did, at least theoretically, in the time of Justinian.19 
 
13. See Caroline Cress, It’s Time to Let Go: Why the Atmospheric Trust Won’t Help the World Breathe 
Easier, 92 N.C. L. REV. 236, 261 (2013). 
14. See Randall S. Abate, Atmospheric Trust Litigation in the United States: Pipe Dream or Pipeline to 
Justice for Future Generations?, in CLIMATE JUSTICE: CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL 
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 542, 557 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2016) (collecting cases). 
15. See Carolyn Kelly, Where the Water Meets the Sky: How an Unbroken Line of Precedent from 
Justinian to Juliana Supports the Possibility of a Federal Atmospheric Public Trust Doctrine, 27 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 183, 193-202 (2019) (collecting cases citing Justinian). 
16. CAESAR FLAVIUS JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. II, I.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., 
Oxford 1911). The Institutes are part of Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, an attempted compilation of existing 
Roman law in the sixth century AD. The Institutes, as opposed to the other component parts of the 
Corpus—the Digest, the Codex, and the Novellae Constitutiones—were meant to work as a kind of 
introductory textbook for law students. See Justinian’s Codification, OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY (3d 
ed. 2003). 
17. CAESAR FLAVIUS JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. II, I.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., 
Oxford 1911). 
18. See Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST 
J.L. & POL’Y 281, 286-87 (2014). 
19. See id. at 283, 286 n.10. Scholars are not at all in agreement that an unbroken line of Public 
Trust Theory runs from the Romans through to today, but American courts routinely treat the PTD as if 
such a connection existed. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997). 




A. Public Trust from Justinian to Lord Hale 
Roman civil law shaped the Canon and English law that came down to 
American jurisprudence.20 Under the English common law, the public trust doctrine 
governed the use of waterways for fishing and navigation, as well as the local use of 
common land.21 One of the Magna Carta’s provisions touched on the public trust in 
the thirteenth century,22 and English courts hundreds of years later continued to refer 
back to that incorporation.23 Over time, the common law came to hold that the 
doctrine prevented the sovereign from granting certain property, or certain interests 
in that property, to private owners—the sovereign ‘owned’ the common lands and 
navigable waters, and was entrusted with ensuring their public use.24 As the Supreme 
Court noted in Shively v. Bowlby: 
 
In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as 
settled that the title in the soil of the sea, and the arms of the sea 
. . . is in the King, except so far as an individual or a corporation 
has acquired rights in it . . . and that this title, jus privatum . . . is 
held subject to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and 
fishing.25  
 
Thus, no matter the sovereign’s degree of interest in granting the title of shores, 
rivers, lakes, or other lands in which the public has an interest to private owners, the 
sovereign does not have the power to grant the full title. As the Michigan Supreme 
Court wrote when explaining the origins of the public trust in a recent case: 
 
20. See generally William Wirt Howe, Roman and Civil Law in America, 16 HARV. L. REV. 342 
(1903); R.C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30 AMER. L. REG. 554, 564 
(1882). 
21. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 
68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475, 475 n.15 (1970). 
22. Magna Carta § 33. This provision prohibits “kydells” or fishing weirs, river-spanning nets 
which prevented navigation and destroyed fish populations. It’s a long stretch from this section to public 
trust in its entirety, but modern writers—Kelly, supra note 15, at 187-88—and English lawyers—Sax, supra 
note 21—say that this is where it all began in the English law. 
23. See, e.g., Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1305 (HL) 1314 (appeal taken 
from Eng.).  
24. Expressed in the dense prose of the period by Sir William Scott, “[a]ll grants of the crown are 
to be strictly construed against the grantee, contrary to the usual policy of the law in the consideration of 
grants, and upon this just ground: that, the prerogatives and rights and emoluments of the crown being 
conferred upon it for great purposes, and for the public use, it shall not be intended that such prerogatives, 
rights, and emoluments are diminished by any grant, beyond what such grant, by necessary and 
unavoidable construction, shall take away.” The Rebeckah (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 158 EWHC (admlty) 159. 
25. 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (citations omitted). 





Thus, when a private party acquire[d] littoral property from the 
sovereign, it acquire[d] only the jus privatum . . . Public rights in 
certain types of access to the waters and lands beneath them 
remain under the protection of the state. Under the public trust 
doctrine, the sovereign never had the power to eliminate those 
rights, so any subsequent conveyances of littoral property remain 
subject to those rights.26 
 
It was in this form—a protection of public rights against private grants—that the 
public trust doctrine made its way to the United States. 
B. Public Trust from the 19th to the 21st Century 
 Public trust litigation in American courts has mirrored the ideal form 
described by English legal scholars—it has prevented the government from placing 
public lands in private hands, and it has prevented sales or grants of public land from 
interfering with public use.27  Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, the premier 
American public trust case, illustrates the similarity.28 The Illinois legislature granted 
what amounted to the entire commercial waterfront of Chicago to the Illinois Central 
Railroad in 1869.29 The grant included the bed of Lake Michigan extending a mile 
from the shoreline, more than a thousand acres of what was traditionally part of the 
public trust.30 A more vigilant legislature rescinded the grant in 1873 and sued the 
railroad company to invalidate the original legislation.31 The Supreme Court found 
for Illinois and wrote that the state’s title to the lake-bed and waters was:  
 
[D]ifferent in character from that which the state holds in lands 
intended for sale . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
state that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed 
from the obstruction or interference of private parties.32 
 
26. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Mich. 2005). For the uninitiated reader, “littoral” 
means, “[o]f or relating to the coast or shore of an ocean, sea, or lake.” Littoral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). 
27. See Sax, supra note 21, at 488-89. 
28. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
29. See id. at 454. 
30. See id. at 433, 454. 
31. See id. at 439. 
32. See id. at 452-54. 





The Court explained that while the state was free to grant use of the shoreline to 
private parties for the construction of “wharves, piers, docks, and other structures” 
which would facilitate the public’s use of the shore, it could not transfer the title to 
and surrender control of an entire harbor to a self-interested corporation.33 The 
enjoyment of the harbor belonged to the people, and “the state [could] no more 
abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested . . . than it 
[could] abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the 
preservation of the peace.”34 
 That kind of holding is largely how courts have implemented the public 
trust doctrine, giving the third branch an avenue to invalidate otherwise apparently 
legal sales and grants of public lands and waters to private actors.35 Public trust has 
enjoyed renewed popularity in recent decades in part because of Professor Joseph 
Sax’s advocacy for the use the public trust doctrine to further democratize state 
government and preserve natural resources.36 State legislatures, whether in good or 
bad faith, often allow industrial and commercial interests to make use of public lands. 
Sax posited that private citizens could challenge these grants by using the courts to 
force legislatures to reconsider their decisions in the light of public scrutiny.37 Sax 
thought that by using the public trust doctrine to bring suit, the small groups of 
citizens concerned with untoward public-private action could bring wider public 
attention to what would otherwise go unnoticed.38 Sax wrote that while many or most 
legislative grants of public land go unnoticed, citizen suits could focus wider attention 
on those that harmed public interests.39 Through the 1980s and into this century, 
“the doctrine has been expanded to protect additional water-related uses such as 
swimming and similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and 
preservation of flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands.”40 Recent 
developments have taken the concept of public trust from its traditional roots in the 
enjoyment of water to the enjoyment of the air and the biosphere.41 
 
33. See id. at 453. 
34. See id. 
35. See Kelly, supra note 15, at 195-99 (collecting cases). 
36. See Sax, supra note 21, at 556-61. 
37. Id. at 558-59. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. 
40. District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
41. Id. 




II. THE SHAPE OF ATMOSPHERIC PUBLIC TRUST LITIGATION 
 In 2011, non-profit organizations like Our Children’s Trust and Kids vs. 
Global Warming began filing ‘atmospheric trust’ lawsuits against states and the 
federal government, alleging they had breached their fiduciary duties by allowing 
polluters to discharge greenhouse gases and warm the Earth.42 Atmospheric trust 
litigation (“ATL”) attempts to bring the air that Justinian’s Institutes described as 
“common to all” back within the fold of the public trust and to apply the doctrine to 
climate change. This section will survey this effort and its results at the state level 
before turning to Juliana to explore the standing issues that stymied the suit in the 
Ninth Circuit. 
A. Atmospheric Trust Across the States 
ATL proceeds by way of five claims: (1) that the air and atmosphere are 
part of the body of the public trust; (2) that present and future generations are 
beneficiaries of the trust; (3) that the government’s fiduciary duty is not just to retain 
the trust in public hands but to protect against impairment of the air and climate, 
amounting to a duty to rectify the carbon imbalance; (4) that courts have the inherent 
power to enforce these trust obligations without specific reference or challenge to a 
particular legislative or executive action; and (5) that, in state courts, governments 
must produce a full accounting of the state’s carbon emissions and a plan to draw 
down emissions by six percent per annum.43 
 In each suit, plaintiffs must find the public trust doctrine in the law and 
frame a cause of action. The best case is where a state constitution contains a public 
trust provision, like in Alaska and New Mexico.44 In states like Oregon, plaintiffs 
 
42. Felicity Barringer, Suit Accuses U.S. Government of Failing to Protect Earth for Generations 
Unborn, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/science/earth/05climate.html; 
Claire Thompson, The Young and the Restless: Kids Sue Government over Climate Change, GRIST (Dec. 9, 
2011), https://grist.org/climate-change/2011-12-08-the-young-and-the-restless-kids-sue-government-
over-climate-chan/; K.J. Dell Antonia, Kids v. the Government, SLATE (May 5, 2011), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2011/05/kids-v-the-government.html?via=recirc_recent. Kids vs. Global 
warming has been rebranded to “iMatter.” See IMATTER, https://www.imatteryouth.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2020). 
43. See generally MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A 
NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE 221 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (describing the common claims of 
atmospheric trust litigation). For state claims, see, e.g., Sanders–Reed ex rel. Sanders–Reed v. Martinez, 
350 P.3d 1221, 1222-23 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State, 335 P.3d 1088, 1091 (Alaska 
2014); Sinnok v. State, No. 3AN-17-09910 CI, 2018 WL 7501030 at *5-6 (Alaska 2018); Chernaik v. 
Brown, 436 P.3d 26, 28-29 (Or. Ct. App. 2019); Aji P. ex rel. Piper v. State, No. 18-2-04448-1 SEA, at 
*4-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2018); First Amended Complaint at *3-6, Reynolds v. Florida, No. 18-CA-000819, 
2020 WL 3410846 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2018). 
44. Article XX § 21 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that “[t]he legislature shall provide 
for . . . control of despoilment of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state,” which the court 
in Sanders–Reed found had created a public trust duty on the part of the state. 350 P.3d at 1222, 1225. 




have appealed to state common law more generally and pointed to the robust public 
trust doctrines of other jurisdictions.45 In Oregon, Our Children’s Trust has 
attempted to make its case under the Federal Constitution, arguing that the Due 
Process clause provides the right to a stable climate.46 
Courts have not viewed sweeping claims for injunctive relief favorably. 
Some have insisted that the public “trust” is just a metaphor and that states bear no 
positive or fiduciary duties towards the people as regards public lands.47 Others have 
refused to expand a doctrine narrowly concerned for most of American history with 
submerged lands to the atmosphere.48 Judges have balked at what they see as an 
expansive scope of requested relief and relied on the political question doctrine to 
kick the issue back to the legislature, even after acknowledging the merits of the 
public trust claims.49 They have frowned on the constitutional claims, with one 
Washington judge noting that “a stable and healthy climate, like world peace and 
economic prosperity, is a shared aspiration—the goal of a people, rather than the 
[substantive due process] right of a person.”50 Finally, at least one court has assumed 
that states bear atmospheric trust duties but held that state environmental agencies 
were the manifestation of that duty and pointed plaintiffs to rulemaking rather than 
litigation.51 
 Organizations attempting ATL have not been stymied by these initial 
setbacks. Our Children’s Trust alone has cases in progress throughout the country. 
Chernaik in Oregon, Sinnok in Alaska, and Aji P. in Washington are on appeal, while 
Reynolds in Florida is awaiting trial.52 Michigan, Florida, and Colorado stonewalled 
Our Children’s Trust’s attempts at rulemaking, but more attempts are in progress in 
 
Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution recognizes a more traditional public trust in navigable waters, 
though its first section announces a broader aim: “It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement 
of its land and the development of its resources by making them available for maximum use consistent 
with the public interest.” ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 1. The court in Kanuk recognized those public trust 
duties. 335 P.3d at 1099 (finding precedent for the public trust doctrine constitutionalized in the 
Constitution of Alaska, article VIII, section 3). 
45. Chernaik, 436 P.3d at 33. 
46. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2020). 
47. E.g., Chernaik, 436 P.3d at 35. 
48. E.g., Filippone ex rel. Filippone v. Iowa Dep’t. of Nat. Res., 829 N.W.2d 589 at 2 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 2013); Aronow v. State, No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012). 
49. E.g., Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1097; see also Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1165. 
50. Aji P. ex rel. Piper v. State, No. 18-2-04448-1 SEA, at *8 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2018). 
51. See Sanders–Reed ex rel. Sanders–Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2015). 
52. Reynolds v. State, No. 18-CA-000819, 2020 WL 3410846 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2018). 




Maine, North Carolina, and New Mexico.53 And of course, Juliana v. United States 
has become Our Children’s Trust’s most famous lawsuit, a test case for the 
application of the public trust doctrine to the atmosphere at the federal level.54  
B. No Ordinary Lawsuit: Juliana and the Fate of ATL on the Federal Level 
 Juliana v. United States, the flagship federal ATL case, represents the best 
arguments for incorporating the atmosphere into the public trust at the federal level 
but also demonstrates why the federal approach is, for the foreseeable future, a non-
starter. Unlike in some of the states, the public trust doctrine was not written into 
the U.S. Constitution and has not been codified by statute or explicitly incorporated 
into federal common law.55 The plaintiffs thus had to argue for the creation or 
incorporation of the public trust doctrine on its own merits, without the support of 
binding precedent. Also, the size, power, and carbon output of the country as a whole 
made the federal government the best target for a suit—in terms of carbon 
reduction—and the candidate for the most straightforward standing analysis. Yet it 
was the same issue of scale that led the Ninth Circuit to reject the plaintiffs’ proposed 
relief, leaving the states as the only viable avenues for ATL. 
Filing in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in 2015, Juliana’s 
child-plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. government had known about and failed to 
address the dangers of greenhouse gases for decades.56 They sought a declaration that 
“their constitutional and public trust rights had been violated” as well as an injunction 
directing the federal government to reduce carbon emissions.57 The federal 
government and several industry intervenors moved to dismiss the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the failure of the plaintiffs to state a cognizable due 
process claim, and the fact that the case presented a political question. Judge Ann 
Aiken denied the defendants’ motions in November, 2016.58 
 
53. See State Judicial Actions Now Pending, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstr 
ust.org/pending-state-actions (last visited Oct. 12, 2020). 
54. See John Schwartz, Young People Are Suing the Trump Administration Over Climate Change. She’s 
Their Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/climate/kids-climate-
lawsuit-lawyer.html.  
55. See Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its Future, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 680-81 (2012). Recall that although Illinois Railroad, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), 
ended up in the Supreme Court, the Court was applying Illinois common law. See supra Section I.B. 
56. See Complaint at 4, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-
cv-01517-TC). 
57. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233. 
58. Id. at 1233–34. 




Judge Aiken took a broad view of the public trust doctrine in her 
reasoning.59 First, since the suit asked “the Court to determine whether Defendants 
have violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights,” Judge Aiken ruled that the issue was 
“squarely within the purview of the judiciary” and was not a political question.60 
Second, Judge Aiken found that the plaintiffs had satisfied each of the three standing 
requirements, injury, causation, and redressability.61 On the injury prong, where 
“general allegations” suffice at the pleading stage, Judge Aiken found that by 
detailing concrete ways the plaintiffs had been harmed by climate change, they had 
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.62 For the causation prong, Judge Aiken 
agreed with the plaintiffs that fossil fuel combustion accounts for the majority of 
U.S. carbon emissions, that the government has the power to control emissions, and 
that the government has historically encouraged rather than discouraged emissions.63 
For the  redressability prong, Judge Aiken found that plaintiff’s broad request for 
relief that the government take whatever actions “necessary to ensure that 
atmospheric CO2 is no more concentrated than 350 ppm by 2100[,]  . . . develop a 
national plan to restore Earth’s energy balance, and implement that national plan so 
as to stabilize the climate system,” was sweeping enough to mitigate plaintiffs’ 
claimed injuries.64 
 Judge Aiken allowed Juliana to proceed to trial,65 but the case then became 
mired in repeated motions for stays, interlocutory appeals, dismissals, and writs of 
mandamus, and was eventually appealed up to the Ninth Circuit.66 Juliana’s fate, 
barring certiorari, was decided by the Court of Appeals in January 2020.67  
 
59. Id. at 1272.  
60. Id. at 1241. 
61. At the federal level, plaintiffs must allege facts which meet standing’s three “prongs.” They 
must claim: (1) that they have suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally-protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,” and “(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical;” (2) that there exists “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the 
result of the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and (3) that (a) it must be 
“likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision,” and 
(b) the remedy must be within the district court’s power to award. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
62. Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1242–43. 
63. Id. at 1246-47. 
64. Id. at 1247-48. 
65. Id. at 1234. 
66. See John Schwartz, Judges Give Both Sides a Grilling in Youth Climate Case Against the Government, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/climate/climate-lawsuit-juliana.html.  
67. John Kruzel, Appeals Court Tosses Kids’ Climate Change Lawsuit, HILL (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/478817-appeals-court-tosses-kids-climate-change-lawsuit.  




The Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Aiken on some points, but ultimately 
dismissed the case on standing. The court quickly dispensed with the government’s 
first argument that “the [Administrative Procedures Act’s] ‘comprehensive remedial 
scheme’ for challenging the constitutionality of agency actions implicitly bars the 
plaintiffs’ freestanding constitutional claims” as meritless.68 But the government’s 
objections to plaintiffs’ standing under Article III were more successful. The court 
agreed with Judge Aiken that the Juliana plaintiffs had identified both concrete 
injuries and causation.69 The court assumed the plaintiffs could establish the first 
prong of redressability—that a comprehensive climate injunction would ameliorate 
the plaintiffs’ injuries—in order to determine whether the court had the power to 
compel remedial action.70  
It was here that federal ATL met a dead end. The Ninth Circuit wrote that 
the Supreme Court had linked the redressability prong of standing with the political 
question doctrine in Rucho v. Common Cause, the landmark gerrymandering case.71 In 
Rucho, the Court found that a proposed mathematical comparison based on expert 
testimony would be “too difficult for the judiciary to manage,” and the Ninth Circuit 
argued that the same conclusion applied in the climate context.72 Even if the court 
agreed with plaintiffs’ experts that carbon must be kept  below 350 parts per million 
with a comprehensive government plan, the majority doubted “that any such plan 
can be supervised or enforced by an Article III court.”73 The Ninth Circuit noted 
that while district courts in the past have ordered the executive to create and 
implement wide-ranging plans for reform,74 the scope of the plaintiffs’ requested 
relief would involve enjoining and evaluating actions by both of the other branches 
of government “for many decades.”75 At that time-scale and level of complexity, 
operating without “‘a constitutional directive or legal standards’ [to] guide the courts’ 
exercise of equitable power,” a district court was ill-positioned to set carbon limits 
across the country.76 Despite Judge Staton’s plea in dissent that “the most basic 
structural principle embedded in our system of ordered liberty [is] that the 
 
68. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2020). 
69. Id. at 1168-69. 
70. Id. at 1169-70. 
71. Id. at 1173; Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 U.S. 2484 (2019). 
72. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173 (citing Rucho, 139 U.S. at 2500-02). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1172 (citing Brown v. Plata, 536 U.S. 493, 537-38 (2011)). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1173 (citing Rucho, 139 U.S. at 2508). 




Constitution does not condone the Nation’s willful destruction,” Juliana marked the 
end of ATL in the federal courts.77 
Piecemeal action will never be as comprehensive as at the national level, but 
the structure of the law makes ATL an easier prospect in the states.78 Likewise, given 
that individual state climate actions have spread across the country in the past, one 
successful suit might spur change faster than we think.79 Michigan might offer some 
of the most fertile ground yet for a public trust challenge of climate policy.  
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN MICHIGAN 
The public trust doctrine has a long history in Michigan, one that judges 
routinely date back to a time before the state entered the Union.80 The Constitutional 
Convention of 196381 incorporated the doctrine in Article IV, Section Fifty-Two, 
declaring that “the conservation and development of the natural resources of the 
state” to be “of paramount public concern”  and calling the legislature to “provide for 
the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state from 
pollution, impairment, and destruction.”82 To enforce this mandate, the legislature 
created state environmental agencies like the Department of Environment, Great 
Lakes, and Energy (“DEGLE”)83 and passed the Michigan Environmental 
Protection Act (“MEPA”) in 1970.84 The Act provides that: 
 
 
77. Id. at 1175 (Staton, J. dissenting). 
78. See generally Benjamin T. Sharp, Stepping into the Breach: State Constitutions as a Vehicle for 
Advancing Rights-Based Climate Litigation, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 39 (2019). 
79. See States Adopting California’s Clean Cars Standards, MD. DEPT. OF THE ENV’T., 
https://mde.maryland.gov/programs/air/mobilesources/pages/states.aspx  (last visited July 23, 2020). 
80. See, e.g., Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 520 (Mich. 1853). 
81. Michigan has had an unusually tumultuous constitutional history. See CITIZENS RSCH. 
COUNCIL OF MICH., NO. 360-02, A BRIEF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1 (2010). 
82. MICH. CONST. art. IV § 52. 
83. Previously the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, née a part of the Department 
of Natural Resources, the agency formerly known as the Department of Environmental Quality, before 
that again a part of the Department of Natural Resources, which was itself originally the Natural Resources 
Commission, all the result of a partisan disagreement over whether development and conservation should 
live under the same umbrella department or not. See Jeffrey K. Haynes et al., MICHIGAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW DESKBOOK 1 (Jeffrey K. Haynes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012) (noting that 
“[r]easonable minds can differ on the wisdom of each of these moves, but each became a fact of our law 
practice.”). 
84. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701. MEPA’s text clarifies that the Constitution incorporates the 
atmosphere within the public trust or, to the very least, recognizes a “public trust in” the “resource” that 
is “the air.” 




The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the 
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation 
occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief 
against any person for the protection of the air, water, and other 
natural resources and the public trust in these resources from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction.85 
 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s treatment of MEPA has waxed and waned 
in its generosity but seems to be on the upswing, and the Court’s respect for public 
trust has always been strong—a promising foundation on which to build an ATL 
claim. This section will survey the history of the public trust doctrine in Michigan, 
its traditional application to water rights, and its recent expansion, which may open 
the door to the explicit inclusion of the atmosphere in case law. This section will also 
explore the courts’ treatment of MEPA and the whirlwind of state standing revisions 
which have cleared the way for an ATL suit. 
A. Michigan’s Public Trust Doctrine from the Northwest Territory through the 
Modern Day 
 Michigan is a watery state, and its public trust cases have centered on water 
rights. Early on, these cases established which rivers were navigable for purposes of 
logging and freight; later, they determined residents’ rights to passage and recreation 
on its rivers and its small and Great lakes.86  
Courts had no doubt that the public trust had passed into the state’s hands: 
 
It will be helpful to recall that Michigan was carved out of the 
Northwest Territory; that the Territory was ceded to the United 
States by Virginia; that the United States held this territory in 
trust for future states to be created out of it; that the United States 
held the waters of navigable rivers and lakes and the soil under 
them in trust for the people, just as the British crown had formerly 
held them in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery; 
that when Michigan entered the union of states, she became 
vested with the same qualified title that the United States had; 
that these waters and the soil under them passed to the state in its 
 
85. Id. § 324.1701(1). 
86. See, e.g., Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 54-55 (Mich. 1926) (holding that the public trust 
does not govern dry land created from lake bottom); Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 527-28 (Mich. 
1853) (reasoning that all navigable-in-fact rivers are subject to the trust, rather than just tidal waters 
according to the English rule); Rushton ex. rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 11 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Mich. 1943) 
(ruling that owners of land on both sides of a sizeable section of navigable river cannot dig trenches in the 
river—or employ any other measures—to prevent wading by fly-fishermen). 




sovereign capacity, impressed with a perpetual trust to secure to 
the people their rights of navigation, fishing, and fowling.87 
 
Until the latter half of the last century, the Michigan Supreme Court largely (and 
perhaps exclusively) applied the doctrine to the state’s waters; if a case touched “soil,” 
it was only that soil lying beneath a lake or river.88 Even today, the major public trust 
cases in Michigan concern riparian and littoral rights. The most recent, Glass v. 
Goeckel, established that the land between the water of the Great Lakes and the 
“ordinary high water mark” is held in trust by the state, meaning that lakeshore 
property owners cannot prevent visitors from walking along their beaches.89 
B. Bringing the Public Trust out of the Water and onto the Land 
It was in the 1970s, in Michigan Oil Company v. Natural Resources Commission, 
that Michigan courts first saw fit to bring the public trust doctrine onto dry land; in 
doing so, they broadened it in a way that could be amenable to ATL. In 1968, the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) leased part of the Pigeon River 
Forest to the Michigan Oil Company.90 It was a bid for quick cash—the Department 
apparently believed that there was no oil in the forest and thus no danger of 
environmental destruction.91 The wisdom of the lease became clear when the Oil 
Company discovered oil in the forest, the home to the only black bear population in 
the lower peninsula, the only elk herd this side of the Mississippi River, and one of 
the only homes for bobcat left in the state.92 As the Court of Appeals wrote, “the 
term ‘blunder’ [was] not too strong a word to describe” the agency’s “decision to 
offer, at public auction, oil and gas leases covering some one-half million acres of 
state owned land . . . with little investigation or consideration of the effects of 
possible drilling.”93 
 
87. Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (Mich. 1926). This recitation is typical. 
88. E.g., Pigorsh v. Fahner, 194 N.W.2d 343, 353 (Mich. 1972) (establishing that while ownership 
of the entire shore of a lake conferred ownership of the lake-bottom, the public maintained a trust interest 
in use of the waters of the lake itself and an interest in the bottom to the extent that owners could not fill 
or dredge without approval by the state). 
89. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Mich. 2005). 
90. Mich. Oil Co. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 249 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), aff’d, 276 
N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1979). The National Resources Commission was a part of the DNR and, as the courts 
have done, both designations will be used interchangeably. 
91. Id. (“It appears from the record presented here that a major reason for leasing the land, and a 
likely reason for the limited consideration of the wisdom of that decision, was a feeling within the 
department that no one would actually do any drilling.”). 
92. Id. at 674. 
93. Id. at 674-75. 




In “an effort by the commission to redeem an apparent mistake,” the DNR 
directed the Supervisor of Wells to deny all permits because drilling would cause 
“serious damage to animal life and molest[] or spoil[] state-owned lands.”94 The Oil 
Company’s position was that the DNR did not have the statutory authority to deny 
the permits.95 It argued in the first place that the State’s Oil Conservation Act had 
placed permitting authority in the hands of the Supervisor of Wells (another state 
authority), not the DNR,96 and in the second, that the Act did not prohibit vague 
spoliation but only unnecessary “waste” in oil exploration.97  
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals saw “nothing wrong with a public 
agency, entrusted with preserving valuable resources to the people of the State of 
Michigan, having once jeopardized those resources, taking all necessary and proper 
steps to rectify previous errors so as to benefit the public.”98 The court interpreted 
the DNR’s directive to the Supervisor as relying not only on the Oil Conservation 
Act, but on the DNR’s “more general powers as trustee of stand land and 
resources.”99 While the DNR had not explicitly made the claim, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the acts which had created the Department had made it a trustee, 
and despite signing the original lease, the DNR “retained its statutory authority to 
fulfill its duty to the people of the State of Michigan by regulating the use of the 
state lands and resources placed in its control and held by it as a public trust.”100 
The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, writing 
that the Oil Conservation Act “placed an affirmative duty on the Supervisor of 
Wells” to prevent “serious or unnecessary damage to or destruction of wildlife, even 
in the absence of specifically promulgated rules and regulations.”101 It likewise held 
that in creating the DNR, the Michigan Legislature had charged the agency with an 
“affirmative duty to protect and conserve the natural resources of the state of 
Michigan.”102 With this understanding, the court found that the DNR not only had 
the statutory authority to deny the drilling permits, but the affirmative duty to do 
so.103  
 
94. Id. at 678, 683. 
95. Id. at 679-80. 
96. Id. at 681. 
97. Id. at 682. 
98. Id. at 683. 
99. Id. at 685. 
100. Id. at 688-89. 
101. Mich. Oil Co. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 276 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Mich. 1979). 
102. Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 299.3 (repealed 1994)). 
103. Id.  




Finally, MEPA had been raised on appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court 
decided that the public trust duties accorded to the DNR resolved the case without 
reference to MEPA, but it “nevertheless” held that MEPA should be read as applying 
to laws like the Oil Conservation Act.104 The court was nodding to the notion that 
even if the DNR’s originating statute had not created public trust duties, it could have 
looked to the Environmental Protection Act to find the same.105 
  In the end, the forest stayed pristine and the Company was left without a 
lease.106 Michigan Oil Company remains good law, which bodes well for the success of 
ATL in Michigan. Any comprehensive atmospheric injunction would force the state 
to back out of contracts made with and permits issued to current carbon producers. 
IV. THE ISSUE OF STANDING  
While standing led to Juliana’s dismissal in the federal system, it should 
present less of a problem in Michigan. The state’s standing doctrine has historically 
been looser than that of the federal courts. Article III of the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution allows the Michigan Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions on 
pending legislation regardless of the existence of a “case or controversy.”107 Article 
VI grants the circuit courts original jurisdiction “in all matters not prohibited by 
law.”108 Working under both articles, the state’s courts have treated standing as a 
prudential, rather than a necessary, requirement, and have resolved cases when 
federal Article III standing was not apparent or was entirely absent.109 
The state Supreme Court briefly tightened Michigan’s standing doctrine 
when it adopted the federal requirements in 2001 in Lee v. Macomb County Board of 
Commissioners and 2004 in National Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co.110 
Luckily for litigious environmentalists in the state, the Court reversed its stance on 
 
104. Id. at 150. 
105. Id. (“Since the MEPA specifically speaks to ‘any alleged pollution, impairment or destruction 
of the air, water or other natural resources,’ it is logical that MEPA should be read in pari materia with 
other statutes relating to natural resources.”). 
106. Id. at 151. 
107. MICH. CONST. art. III, § 8. 
108. MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 13 (granting the circuit courts "original jurisdiction in all matters 
not prohibited by law . . . .”). 
109. Issuing advisory opinions is an obvious case, but ordinary Michiganders have often made use 
of this oddity of the state’s standing doctrine to do what would elsewhere be impossible: suing public 
entities to force compliance with legal duties or to enforce a public right without any statutory or common 
law cause of action. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Gilleland, 157 N.W. 609, 609 (Mich. 1916) (collecting cases); 
see also Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Mich. 2010) (collecting 
cases). 
110. See Lee v. Macomb Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Mich. 2001); Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 805-06 (Mich. 2004). 




both issues a few years later in Lansing Schools Education Association v. Lansing Board 
of Education, which now controls standing in the state.111 Over a few pages, the 
majority rejected the logic of Lee and Cleveland Cliffs: 
 
[N]ot only does the federal standing jurisprudence have no basis 
in Michigan law, it is contrary to it. As explained above, before 
Lee, the standing doctrine was not treated as a constitutional 
requirement in Michigan jurisprudence; that is, the Court never 
concluded that a lack of standing equated to the lack of a 
controversy necessary for the invocation of the judicial power 
under the Michigan Constitution. As discussed, before Lee, from 
the doctrine's inception this Court has at times addressed a case's 
merits despite concluding that the parties lacked standing. And, 
more generally, before Lee, “controversy” was never interpreted, 
as it is under Lujan, to refer only to instances where the party 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury caused directly by the 
challenged conduct. Thus, the Michigan Constitution does not 
compel adoption of the federal standing doctrine, and there is no 
support for doing so in this Court's historical jurisprudence.112 
 
The state’s standing requirements would be “restored to a limited, prudential 
doctrine” under which “a litigant has standing wherever there is a legal cause of 
action.”113 Where no cause of action exists by statute, standing will exist (1) “if the 
litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally 
affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large,” or, (2) as in the case of 
laws like MEPA, “if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to 
confer standing on the litigant.”114  
 The Lansing Schools court’s explicit purpose in returning to Michigan’s 
traditional approach was to remove the barriers that federal standing presents to 
plaintiffs115 and to return to a doctrine whose aim is only “to ensure sincere and 
vigorous advocacy.”116  While the Lansing Schools decision is brief on what exactly 
 
111. 792 N.W.2d at 695-96.  
112. Id. at 695 (citations omitted). 
113. Id. at 699. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 698 (“[T]he federal standing doctrine has the effect of encouraging courts to decide the 
merits of a case under the guise of merely deciding that the plaintiff lacks standing, thus using standing 
to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the 
merits.” (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
116. Id. 




ensures such advocacy, pre-Lee cases indicate that plaintiffs must possess an “interest 
in the outcome of the litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.”117 
Where the litigation concerns the enforcement of a public right, as ATL would, 
plaintiffs must also show that a failure to enforce that right would harm them in some 
“manner differently than the citizenry at large.”118 Exactly how causation works in 
the Michigan standing context is unclear. Lansing Schools did not address it, and those 
pre-Lansing and pre-Lee opinions which exist rely on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Lujan that Lansing rejected.119 Post-Lansing Schools cases point to the 
intuitive conclusion that there must be some causal connection between the claimed 
violation of right or interest and the resulting harm.120 Neither Lansing Schools nor 
any Michigan case that followed has addressed redressability, but the Lansing Schools 
court did take pains to point out that Michigan courts retain significantly more power 
than their federal counterparts.121  
A. The Michigan Environmental Protection Act 
The Michigan Supreme Court has also largely been amenable to plaintiffs 
seeking to preserve the public trust through the Michigan Environmental Protection 
Act. The Act allows any person to bring an action against any person, including legal 
persons like corporations and the state, “for the protection of the air, water, and other 
natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, 
or destruction.”122 The purpose of the law was to grant private citizens the power and 
the obligation “to prevent or minimize degradation of the environment,”123 reasoning 
that citizen action was “now practically necessary to expedite what the ideal of laissez 
 
117. Dodak v. State Admin. Bd., 495 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Mich. 1993). 
118. Alexander v. City of Norton Shores, 307 N.W.2d 476, 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
119. See, e.g., Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Detroit, 537 N.W.2d 436, 445 (Mich. 1995) 
(Cavanagh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Killeen v. Wayne Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 357 
N.W.2d 851, 855 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). 
120. See Duncan v. State, 832 N.W.2d 761, 785 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (Whitbeck, P.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).  
121. Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 694 (Mich. 2010). 
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.301(h) (defining “person” as 
an “individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental entity, or other legal entity”). 
123. Ray v. Mason Cnty. Drain Comm’r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich. 1975). 




faire has been too slow in accomplishing.”124 The legislature hoped that under MEPA, 
courts would begin to develop “a common law of environmental quality.”125  
MEPA dispels many of the problems that ATL has encountered in federal 
and state courts. It grants standing to the public at large to bring suit on behalf of 
the environment.126 The statute directs courts to examine, and if necessary revise, 
existing environmental standards; and where standards are absent, the statute 
mandates that courts create them.127 MEPA directs the state’s administrative 
agencies to take the same care to prevent “pollution, impairment, or destruction” of 
natural resources “or the public trust in these resources,”128 and directs courts not to 
defer to administrative agencies.129 Under MEPA, courts may direct parties to 
administrative proceedings but retain jurisdiction over the action and review results 
de novo.130 MEPA does not require exhaustion of administrative or other remedies.131  
With such broad language and sweeping grants of power to private citizens 
and the courts, MEPA immediately faced challenges, but the state’s third branch of 
government has largely been constant in its defense. Attacked for vagueness in Ray 
v. Mason City Drain Commissioner, the Michigan Supreme Court wrote that the law’s 
diction “is neither illusive nor vague;” that “‘[p]ollution,’ ‘impairment,’ and 
‘destruction’ are taken directly” from the state’s constitution, and that those terms 
had acquired definite meanings in “this new area of common law.”132 In the same 
case, the Court denied that MEPA improperly passes legislative or executive 
authority to the courts.133 MEPA expanded the jurisdiction of the courts to all natural 
resources, not just those in the traditional public trust—navigable waters and state-
owned land—and the courts have shut down challenges to that expansion.134 MEPA’s 
 
124. Daniels v. Allen Industries, Inc., 216 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Mich. 1974). 
125. Ray, 224 N.W.2d at 888 (quoting Thomas J. Anderson, one of the architects of MEPA, from 
a press release at the time of passage). 
126. Id. 
127. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(2)(a)-(b). 
128. § 324.1705. 
129. See W. Mich. Env’t Action Council, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 275 N.W.2d 538, 546-47 
(Mich. 1979) [hereinafter WMEAC]. 
130. See id. at 542; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1704(1). 
131. See Addison Twp. v. Gout, 429 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 
443 N.W.2d 139 (Mich. 1989), vacated, leave granted, 444 N.W.2d 528 (Mich. 1989), aff’d, 460 N.W.2d 
215 (Mich. 1990). 
132. Ray v. Mason Cnty. Drain Comm’r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 n.10 (Mich. 1975).  
133. Id. at 888. 
134. E.g., Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“We find nothing in the 
language which would limit the protection in the act to natural resources affecting land in which there is 
a public trust or a right to public access.”). 




broad sweep is well established in Michigan, and so is the first hurdle that any MEPA 
plaintiff has to clear at the outset is the prima facie case. 
Under MEPA, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that the 
defendant’s conduct “has, or is likely to pollute, impair, or destroy” natural resources 
or the public trust in them.135 For a prima facie case, the extent of damage need not 
be certain; “apparently serious and lasting, though unquantified” environmental 
destruction suffices.136 Even the fact of damage can be indeterminate, as long as some 
probability of that damage exists.137 The defendant then has two options: (1) she may 
attempt to rebut the claim with contrary evidence or; (2) she may offer the 
affirmative defense that there is “no feasible and prudent alternative” to her conduct 
and that her actions are “consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety 
and welfare in light of the state’s paramount concern for the protection of its natural 
resources . . . .”138 
The required degree of damage has risen and fallen over time, with the Court 
of Appeals creating different standards and tests to narrow MEPA’s application, but 
the controlling case is now Nemeth v. Abonmarche Development, Inc.139 The Nemeth 
court set out to determine “the proper threshold of harm for a prima facie MEPA 
case.”140 The court repudiated various lower court rulings which had restricted the 
definitions of “natural resource” and “harm” under MEPA,141 writing that “their use 
in every case has stifled the development of the ‘common law of environmental 
quality.’”142 The Court ultimately decided that, first, if plaintiffs can show that a 
defendant has violated a pollution statute, they have established a prima facie case.143 
Second, where there is no applicable statute, the general rules of evidence set the 
floor of the inquiry: “[A] plaintiff has established a prima facie case when his case is 
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sufficient to withstand a motion by the defendant that the judge direct a verdict in 
the defendant’s favor.”144 The end result is that litigants need to make a detailed 
factual showing of some concrete harm to the environment, actual or potential, in a 
freewheeling common law inquiry that leaves space for plaintiff creativity. 
V. A MICHIGAN ATMOSPHERIC TRUST LAWSUIT 
Plaintiffs looking to file an ATL suit would have two options: they could 
pursue a comprehensive ATL claim under the public trust provisions of the Michigan 
Constitution or they could go the MEPA route. For the purposes of this Note, 
comprehensive ATL means making the five classic claims referenced earlier: (1) that 
the air and atmosphere are part of the body of the public trust; (2) that present and 
future generations are beneficiaries of the trust; (3) that the government’s fiduciary 
duty is not just to retain the trust in public hands but to protect against impairment 
of the air and climate, amounting to a duty to rectify the carbon imbalance; (4) that 
courts have the inherent power to enforce these trust obligations, without specific 
reference or challenge to a particular legislative or executive action; and (5) that, in 
state courts, governments must produce a full accounting of the state’s carbon 
emissions and a plan to draw down emissions by six percent per annum.145  Each tack 
would present its own obstacles, and both would have to contend with the political 
question and separation of powers analysis that ended ATL’s run in the federal 
courts. 
A. Under a Theory of Naked Public Trust 
Pursuing ATL through the public trust doctrine in Michigan should be 
more straightforward than in the federal courts. The Michigan Constitution 
incorporates the doctrine, Lansing Schools outlines a cause of action, and standing in 
the state is less restrictive. Rather than needing to frame and place a cause in an inapt 
part of a statute or constitution, Michigan allows standing to handle as-yet unused 
causes. Under Lansing Schools, “[w]here a cause of action is not provided at law, then 
a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing.”146  
As simplified by Lansing Schools, to achieve standing, a litigant need only 
show that she has a special right or substantial interest harmed differently than the 
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general population.147 Public trust itself, as codified in the Michigan Constitution of 
1963, grants plaintiffs this “substantial interest” in the atmosphere.148 Potential 
Michigan litigants could plead “special injur[ies] . . . different from the citizenry at 
large” in the same way as the Juliana plaintiffs, detailing the concrete and 
particularized ways that climate change has affected them personally as opposed to 
society in general.149 While the state Supreme Court has not clarified whether 
causation and redressability apply at all in Michigan standing analysis,150 it stands to 
reason that plaintiffs would benefit, or at least not be harmed, by showing that the 
state has caused their harms and that the court has the power to redress them. 
For causation, plaintiffs will want to show that their injuries are traceable 
to the challenged action of the state of Michigan. Given that Michigan is not one of 
the nation’s top energy consumers,151 the shape of the pleading here is important—
plaintiffs should not allege that Michigan has alone caused climate change or that 
equitable relief against Michigan would stop it. Plaintiffs should instead argue by 
analogy to Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (“Massachusetts v. EPA”), 
where the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that although Massachusetts’ own carbon 
emissions might not be a major global source of greenhouse gases, the EPA’s failure 
to regulate the state’s emissions “at a minimum, ‘contribute[d]’” to the state’s 
injuries.152 Plaintiffs should also point out that the state Constitution does not only 
protect the “air” and “natural resources” of the state from “destruction,” but also 
“impairment” and “pollution” of the same, both of which are caused by excess 
carbon.153 
For lack of an established Michigan structure, it may help to look at 
redressability as it is laid out in the federal courts.154 The first prong of 
redressability—whether the requested relief will ameliorate the plaintiffs’ harms—
falls into the same analysis as causation. After all, the two prongs “overlap and are 
two facets of a single causation requirement,” with causation examining “the 
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connection between the alleged misconduct and injury,” while “redressability 
analyzes the connection between the alleged injury and requested judicial relief.”155 
Michigan’s emissions are not a primary cause of climate change and reducing them 
would not halt the process, but plaintiffs should again analogize to Massachusetts v. 
EPA, where the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that while an injunction “may not by 
itself reverse global warming, it does not follow that the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
decide whether [a party] has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”156 No action on 
Michigan’s part would reverse climate change, but given that the state Constitution 
specifies that the “conservation . . . of the natural resources of the state” are a matter 
of “paramount public concern,” plaintiffs would have a strong argument as to the 
state’s duty to “provide for the protection of the air . . . and other natural resources” 
of the state from “impairment” or “pollution.”157  
The second prong of redressability asks whether the requested relief is 
within the court’s power to award.158 Were the state to assert, like the Ninth Circuit, 
that the scope of the relief requested by any comprehensive ATL claim is simply 
beyond the judicial power to enjoin the other two branches of government, plaintiffs 
have a few rebuttals. In the absence of clear direction under Lansing Schools, potential 
plaintiffs could point out by analogy to the federal system that wide-ranging policy-
oriented injunctions are and have been ably managed by courts.159 In conjunction, the 
plaintiffs could point to the vague but expansive language of Lansing Schools. The 
Lansing Schools court wrote that Michigan courts are not bound by the “Article III 
case-or-controversy requirement” that gave rise to Lujan and that “state courts” hold 
a “broader power.”160 Likewise, Lansing Schools overturned Nestle, which had 
determined that MEPA violated separation of powers by allowing courts to enforce 
the law, traditionally an executive function.161 Plaintiffs could argue that in the same 
way that MEPA did not violate the separation of powers, neither would an ATL 
injunction, echoing Justice Weaver’s reminder in Cleveland Cliffs that “the three 
branches of government cannot ‘operate in all respects independently of the 
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others.”162 Finally, plaintiffs could cite to MEPA’s direction that courts create new 
environmental standards as an explicit statement of the broad powers of the Michigan 
courts to direct the other branches of government.163  
At that point, plaintiffs may run into the last potential problem of an ATL 
suit under the bare public trust—that MEPA preempts an independent suit under 
the public trust doctrine. In Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals acknowledged that the state’s constitution had incorporated 
the public trust doctrine but held that the government had already discharged its 
public trust duties by creating environmental agencies.164 The New Mexico court 
dismissed plaintiffs’ public trust suit and directed them to pursue rulemaking with 
those agencies instead.165 In the Michigan context, the state could similarly try to 
argue that the legislature has already discharged the public trust duties it holds under 
Article IV Section Fifty-Two of the state Constitution. In doing so, the legislature 
could claim that MEPA and the environmental agencies it created leave no room for 
an independent ATL suit. While Michigan courts have yet to give explicit guidance 
on the issue of preemption,166 there is no reason that plaintiffs could not 
simultaneously proceed under both plain public trust doctrine and MEPA. If the 
Michigan courts decide that MEPA has subsumed the public trust, at least the 
MEPA claim still has a chance to survive. 
B. Under MEPA 
A MEPA-based attack on Michigan’s contributions to climate change 
would, like a public trust-based ATL suit, require a new approach in the state. 
Ordinary MEPA actions attack one permit or project at a time. Comprehensive ATL 
suits attempt to draw down total state emissions through just one case by alleging 
that entire regulatory schemes, instead of scattered, single corporate or governmental 
actions, pose a threat to the natural resources of a state. To succeed, plaintiffs need 
to claim that a state, in the way that it has regulated and permitted industry, 
commerce, and even residential housing, has contributed to the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases and allowed for the destruction of the environment. In Michigan, 
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the text of MEPA itself presents no obstacle to this approach nor to ATL’s five classic 
claims. The statute provides that a plaintiff may “maintain an action” against “any 
person,” including the state itself, for “equitable relief” in order to protect the state’s 
natural resources.167 The only potential issues related to a MEPA suit of this scope 
would be the novelty of a statewide approach and the judiciary’s reluctance to reach 
so far in granting injunctive relief. 
To begin, though, to establish a prima facie case under MEPA, plaintiffs 
will need to prove facts showing that the conduct of the state—its regulatory schemes 
and permitting decisions—“has or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water 
or other natural resources.”168 Plaintiffs’ harms need not be “restricted to actual 
environmental degradation but [may] also encompass[] probable damage to the 
environment as well.”169 It will not be difficult to show that the state, through its 
agencies, has allowed significant amounts of carbon into the atmosphere and that it 
continues to do so.170 It will likewise not be difficult to show that carbon is having 
deleterious effects on the state of the atmosphere.171 Plaintiffs could also point out 
that, as the Michigan Court of Appeals wrote in Stevens v. Creek, climate change is 
not just threatening natural resources themselves, but “the public trust in those 
resources.”172 That is, climate change is destroying not only the atmosphere and the 
climate that supports the biosphere of Michigan but also the traditional and 
recreational interests in and uses of that biosphere.173 Were a trial court to inquire 
into whether Michigan state was a significant or major source of the carbon causing 
climate change, plaintiffs could take either or both of two approaches: (1) to rely on 
the logic of Massachusetts v. EPA, as in the standing analysis above;174 or (2) to rely 
 
167. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1). “Equitable relief” covers declaratory relief: (1) that the 
atmosphere be declared part of the public trust; (2) that present and future generations be declared 
beneficiaries of the trust; (3) that the court declare that government has a duty to rectify carbon imbalance; 
and injunctive relief: (4) that the court enjoin action to enforce the trust obligations; and (5) that the court 
enjoin the government produce an accounting of carbon emissions and a plan to draw down on carbon by 
six percent per annum. 
168. Ray v. Mason Cnty. Drain Comm’r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich. 1975). 
169. Id.  
170. See supra note 151. 
171. See, e.g., Wallace-Wells, supra note 1. 
172. Stevens v. Creek, 328 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
173. For example, the lack of snow hampering winter sports, heavy rain and flooding impairing the 
use of rivers and the parks they flow through, warming waters in the Great Lakes killing fish and causing 
algae blooms, flora and fauna extinctions due to a changing climate impairing enjoyment of, inter alia, 
Michigan’s state and metroparks. EPA, NO. 430-F-16-024, WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE MEANS FOR 
MICHIGAN (2016), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/cli
mate-change-mi.pdf.  
174. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 499 (2007). 




on the bare text of MEPA and the cases interpreting it, extrapolating out Michigan’s 
carbon output as “encompass[ing] probable damage to the environment.”175  
As for the novel statewide approach, plaintiffs would need to argue that 
while MEPA has generally been used to target individual actions, the statute’s plain 
text and the cases interpreting it empower courts to interrogate and modify 
regulatory schemes where they fall short of protecting the state’s natural resources 
and the public trust in the same. MEPA reads that “in granting relief,” where there 
is a standard for pollution “by the state or an instrumentality” thereof, the court may 
“determine the validity, applicability, and reasonableness of the standard,” or “if a 
court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption of a standard approved and 
specified by the court.”176 In this case, the plaintiffs would be attacking standards of 
pollution in a grander sense: the statutory schemes that give rise, overall, to the state’s 
carbon output. In making its determinations under MEPA, the court need not defer 
to any agency decisions or proceedings.177 In Ray v. Mason Cty. Drain Commissioner, 
the Michigan Supreme Court confirmed that the Legislature, in granting the courts 
such sweeping authority over the administration of the state, did not 
unconstitutionally violate separation of powers.178 The scope of the requested 
injunctive relief would likely force the state to renege on contracts and permits 
granted to carbon-emitters, but the Michigan courts have already sanctioned 
retractions of the kind, as seen in Michigan Oil.179 
Despite the permissiveness of Michigan law, sweeping injunctive relief will 
only be granted from a court with a measure of resolve and, in all likelihood, the 
political inclination to act. Resolve, at least, may be in greater supply as Michigan 
winters get warmer and its weather weirder.180 As far as political inclination, that may 
depend on the outcome of the next few judicial retirements and elections. 
CONCLUSION 
The enactment of the MEPA signals a dramatic change from the 
practice where the important task of environmental law 
enforcement was left to administrative agencies without the 
opportunity for participation by individuals or groups of citizens. 
Not every public agency proved to be a diligent and dedicated 
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defender of the environment. The MEPA has provided a sizable 
share of the initiative for environmental law enforcement for that 
segment of society most directly affected—the public.181 
 
The public trust doctrine may date back to the time of Justinian or before, 
but the threat to the environment that governments hold in trust for their people has 
never been more modern or more pressing. As the Ninth Circuit decided most 
recently, and as courts across the country have noted, combating climate change with 
what have traditionally been the limited powers of the third branch is a long shot. 
But in the face of legislative inaction and executive intransigence, it may be time for 
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